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PUBLIC MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF STATE-OPERATED PATIENT
COMPENSATION FUNDS
Frank A. Sloan,* Carrie A. Mathews,** Christopher J. Conover,***
and William M. Sage****
INTRODUCTION
During the past three decades, medical malpractice insurance has
experienced periodic crises of lack of available coverage and/or in-
creased price of coverage.' One solution in some states has been the
implementation of public medical malpractice insurance plans, the
most common type being Patient Compensation Funds (PCFs).2 By
definition, PCFs offer insurance for medical malpractice liability that
exceeds the specified threshold amounts covered by the insured pro-
vider's primary insurance policy or qualified self-insured plan.
3
The underlying rationale for public provision or reliance on private
insurers other than stock companies is that the for-profit sector is an
unreliable source of medical malpractice liability coverage. Faced
with a few high loss claims, it is difficult for insurers to know whether
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1. See generally Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2281 (2003); David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 NEw ENC. J. MED. 283
(2004).
2. Frank A. Sloan, Public Medical Malpractice Insurance (Report of The Pew Charitable
Trusts Project on Med. Liability in Pa., Mar. 2004), http:/medliabilitypa.orglresearch/files/
sloan03O4.pdf. Although some states call these funds by different names, for purposes of our
study, the general term "Patient Compensation Fund," or PCF, will be used to identify these
types of public funds.
3. See id.; PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., FINAL REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF AN OHIO
PATIENTS' COMPENSATION FUND (May 1, 2003), http://www.ohioinsurance.gov/legal/REPORTS/
FinalReportOhioPatientComp.pdf.
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the change is a random occurrence or represents a true shift in claim-
ing patterns. As a result, for-profit firms may either raise premiums
substantially or exit from the market entirely. The public or non-
profit organizational forms, including PCFs, in principle, provide a
more stable form of affordable coverage. Since much of the volatility
in losses stems from losses at the high end of the claims distribution,
PCFs may, by focusing on high loss claims, stabilize an otherwise very
unstable medical malpractice insurance market.
State-operated PCFs represent one of several public policy options
for addressing the dual problems of lack of available coverage and
affordable coverage. 4 Although they have existed for nearly three de-
cades, relatively little is known about their performance. This study
addresses two related issues. The first is essentially descriptive: How
do these PCFs operate and what have been their successes and fail-
ures? The second is prescriptive: What role should these organiza-
tions play as states look to solutions to their medical malpractice
crises?
As of early 2004, the following nine states had created PCFs: Indi-
ana (1975),5 Kansas (1976),6 Louisiana (1975),7 Nebraska (1976),8
New Mexico (1978),9 New York (1986),10 Pennsylvania (1975, 2002),11
South Carolina (1976), 12 and Wisconsin (1975).13 Florida had a PCF,
but the program closed in 1983, having underpriced coverage. 14
4. Sloan, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Id.; Tanya Albert, Indiana Doctors Face Big Hit for Liability Fund, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept.
8, 2003. at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2003/09/08/prl2O9O8.htm.
6. Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, Home Page, at http://www.hcsf.org/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2005).
7. State of Louisiana, Louisiana Patient Compensation Fund, at http://www.lapcf.state.la.us/
(last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
8. American Tort Reform Association, Medical Liability Reform, at http://www.atra.org/show/
7338 (last visited Feb. 10, 2005).
9. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, ANNOTATED REPORT 2001.
10. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., THE STATUS OF THE PRIMARY AND EXCESS MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE MARKET AND THE FUTURE NEED FOR THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE As-
SOCIATION: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF
INSURANCE (1997).
11. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & ANNA BARTOW, UNDERSTANDING PENNSYLVANIA'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CRISIS (Report of The Pew Charitable Trusts Project on Med. Liability in Pa.,
June 2003), http://medliabilitypa.org/research/report06o3/UnderstandingReport.pdf.
12. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, A REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PA-
TIENTS' COMPENSATION FUND (Jan. 2000), http://www.state.sc.us/sclac/Reports/2000/pcf.pdf.
13. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., STATE OF WIS., WISCONSIN PATIENT COMPENSATION
FUND, http://oci.wi.gov/pcf.htm (last modified June 30, 2004).
14. See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., INSURING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 123 (1991).
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Nonetheless, Florida was still paying claims as of April 2003.15 Wyo-
ming's legislature passed a statute creating a PCF, but it was never
formally created in practice.'
6
Data for our study came from several sources: literature reviews,
Internet searches, and a survey of all nine PCFs from research that we
conducted during late 2003 and early 2004. We spoke with representa-
tives at each of the PCFs by telephone (seven states) or by in-person
interview (two states). During the interviews, we requested additional
material, which was provided by some PCFs. To fill in missing data,
we performed Internet searches to obtain publicly available material
that provided financial data and other information about these PCFs.
II. MOTIVATIONS FOR CREATING A PCF
Eight of the nine PCFs (all except New York) were created in the
mid-1970s in response to the first medical malpractice insurance crisis,
which was precipitated by a withdrawal of insurers from markets in
many states. 17 Although withdrawal of insurers and premium in-
creases were widespread, only a handful of states adopted PCFs, and
these tended to be states not typically identified as states suffering the
greatest medical malpractice crisis.' 8
PCFs are often implemented as part of more general tort reform,
which includes in different combinations: limits on non-economic
damages, limits on attorney contingent fees, modification of the collat-
eral source rule, creation of physician-sponsored medical malpractice
insurance companies, Joint Underwriting Associations (JUAs) for
medical malpractice insurance, and other statutory changes. Judging
from the survey responses, the importance of the PCF in relation to
the entire reform package varied. For example, in Indiana, the intro-
duction of a PCF was minor relative to the cap on total damages en-
acted at the same time. By contrast, in Wisconsin, the PCF seems to
have been a much more important part of the reform package. 19 The
risk assumed by PCFs is sensitive to otier laws that were adopted, in
15. FLA. INS. COUNCIL, THE GOVERNOR'S SELECT TASK FORCE ON HEALTHCARE PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE (Jan. 2003), available at www.doh.state.fl.us/myflorida/DOH-
Large-Final%20Book.pdf.
16. Telephone Interview with Charlie Hartman, Wyoming Insurance Department (July 16-17,
2003); Tom Morton, Panel Dumps State Malpractice Insurance Idea, CASPER STAR TRIB., Oct. 28,
2003, http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2003/10/28/news/wyoming/dbebb5ab96666b
3 deO6
f89390f947e99.txt.
17. See generally Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crisis" of the
1970's: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 629 (1985).
18. Id.
19. Id.; OFFCE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13.
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particular, limits on total or non-economic loss, which had the effect
of placing at least a partial ceiling on the PCF's exposure to loss. 20
The interviews revealed two major motivations for forming PCFs:
(1) providing physicians and hospitals with affordable and reliable
medical malpractice insurance coverage by covering losses at the
higher end of the distribution of losses, thereby reducing volatility;
and (2) providing adequate compensation for injured patients in the
state. The first goal was of primary interest to providers. The second
was of interest to the trial bar.
In contrast to other statutory changes, PCFs have generally been
supported by medical and hospital associations and groups represent-
ing plaintiffs and defendants in medical malpractice litigation, proba-
bly because they served both of the above goals. The motivation for
trial lawyer support has been to assure ample compensation for medi-
cal injuries. In Pennsylvania, several persons we interviewed empha-
sized trial lawyer support of the existing system. There were some
exceptions, namely, the medical community in Pennsylvania and trial
attorneys both in Louisiana and Indiana.
In general, PCFs are much the same as they were at inception.
Over the years, the PCFs have accomplished the following: (1) in-
creased the amount of primary insurance the provider must have to be
eligible for PCF coverage, resulting in changes to the level at which
the PCF begins coverage; (2) increased the level of limits on damages
for those states with such limits; (3) implemented new methods of
monitoring PCF activities; and (4) moved toward funding PCFs on a
fully reserved rather than on a pay-as-you-go basis (although Penn-
sylvania retains the pay-as-you-go method).
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF PCFs
A. Mandatory Versus Voluntary Coverage
PCFs in a few cases require the participation of providers.21 The
case for requiring coverage is to expand the base of enrollment and
avoid adverse selection of bad risks into the PCF.22 On the other
hand, the case for being voluntary is to provide coverage as a last re-
20. See generally, e.g., RICHARD S. BIONDI & ARTHUR GUREVITCH, MILLIMAN USA, PRO-
JECTED EFFECT OF CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES ON PENNSYLVANIA PHYSICIAN PROFES-
SIONAL LIABILITY COSTS (2003), www.wsma.org/Milliman-Report.pdf.
21. See infra app. A, tbl. 1.
22. PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF AN
OHIO PATIENTS' COMPENSATION FUND (Feb. 2003), http://www.ohioinsurance.gov/egaU/Reports/
PrelimPatient Compensation Report_03-03-03.pdf; PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., supra
note 3.
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sort, much like a JUA.23 Only three of the PCFs were mandatory:
Kansas, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. One PCF representative com-
mented that the mandatory nature of the PCF is a critical aspect of its
success for the following three reasons: (1) it establishes a wide pre-
mium base, facilitating loss projections and rate-making; (2) it pro-
vides a uniform level of coverage across the state, assuring that injury
victims will be able to receive compensation as determined by the
court; and (3) it provides primary insurers with an upper limit of liabil-
ity exposure.
B. Funding
With one exception described below, the PCFs have always been
funded from assessments on providers and investment returns, not
from state subsidies.24 Providers pay assessments either directly to the
PCF or as part of the premium paid to primary insurers. While eight
of the PCF states have not used public funds in the past, one state was
considering, as of late 2003, taking a loan from a different state fund
to cover part of its unfunded liability. Assessments are generally
structured as a fraction of the premium paid for primary coverage.
PCFs do vary surcharges by specialty, either reflecting physicians' pri-
mary insurance classification (as in Pennsylvania) 25 or establishing a
few specialty-based risk classes (e.g., four in Wisconsin). 26 Like JUAs,
PCFs often have the authority to assess insured physicians retroac-
tively to cover unanticipated losses.
27
In New York, the state has subsidized the purchase of private excess
insurance for physicians since 2000.28 The New York program in its
current form is strictly a public subsidy program. Physicians are able
to choose the private insurer for the excess layer, but they are en-
couraged to use the same insurer as they use for their primary cover-
age so that claims management and potential legal defense can be
coordinated. 29 In a fundamental sense, the New York program differs
from the others in that there is no public provision of insurance.
23. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS: TRENDSALERT
(May 2003), available at http://www.csg.org/NR/rdonlyres/ek7ao3dfatxrcgh656amm6vnlw
2
owndpku4rp3xhss32rzeche5ggb4j4mbwdozh4zsobfboqxysz3bnp5crc6rrae/Medical+Malprac-
tice+%28May+Revised%29.pdf.
24. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE (1987).
25. Christopher J. Conover et al., Excess Coverage and the Medical Malpractice Crisis: A
Study of Pennsylvania (Nov. 22, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
26. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13.
27. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 14.
28. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10.
29. See id. at 10; infra app. A, tbl. 1.
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There is, however, public involvement in funding and in premium
regulation. 30
PCFs differed on whether or not assessments reflected prior claims
experience of the provider. Four PCFs had the authority to take ac-
tion in response to adverse claims, whether by removing providers
from the PCF or attaching an experience-rated increase to the annual
surcharge.31 In a fifth case, the Kansas Board of Governors received
lists of providers with high claims frequency, and the Board was
vested with the authority to eliminate providers from PCF coverage
(this has only happened once, as it is a difficult process).32
Three states have incorporated experience-rating into their assess-
ments.33 South Carolina providers are charged a higher rate based on
the number of claims against them. 34 Louisiana identifies providers
with high numbers of cases, and then attaches a specific percentage
increase to the assessment. 35 In the last rate package sent to provid-
ers, New Mexico included an experience-rating system for the first
time.36 Depending on the number of claims a provider has received
(one, two, three, or more than four), there is a standardized increase
in the surcharge. 37 For those with a high claims frequency, this can
result in an additional 100% surcharge on top of the normal annual
assessment. 38 The 2002 PCF statute in Pennsylvania included the con-
cept of experience-rating, but this provision has not been imple-
mented to date. 39 Wisconsin uses a peer review process to monitor
physicians with a high number of claims.40
PCFs differ according to whether they reserve for anticipated losses
or operate on a pay-as-you-go basis. Pay-as-you-go financing is a
common practice among social insurance programs, such as Social Se-
curity and Medicare. In the Social Security program, for example,
30. Id.
31. See generally State of Louisiana, supra note 7; N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra
note 9; N.Y. DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10; BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11; S.C. LEGISLA-
TIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12.
32. Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, supra note 6.
33. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra note 9, at 30; S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL,
supra note 12, at 11; STATE OF LA., RATE MANUAL: LOUISIANA'S PATIENT COMPENSATION
FUND 12 (2004), http://www.lapcf.state.la.us/rateman/2004/PCF%20Rate%2OManual%202004.
doc.;
34. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 11.
35. STATE OF LA., supra note 33, at 12.
36. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra note 9, at 30.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. University of Pennsylvania Health System, Medical Malpractice, The CAT Fund & Act
135, at http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/legal/malp.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2004).
40. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13.
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premium taxes from current employees and employers pay for retire-
ment benefits of retired workers.41 The implicit contract is that while
younger persons subsidize the benefits of older persons, their benefits
will in turn be subsidized by others when they become age-eligible.
42
Pennsylvania operates a pay-as-you-go system, as did South Caro-
lina until recently, and Wisconsin and Louisiana in their early histo-
ries.43 When a provider pays an annual assessment in these states, the
provider does not buy coverage for the current year's medical mal-
practice claims, but rather pays for losses incurred in previous years
that have just become due.44 In such instances, the providers subject
to annual assessments effectively are the holders of reserves for the
PCF and each year's assessment is more properly viewed as a claim on
these reserves rather than a true premium for coverage. This arrange-
ment has the political advantage of requiring lower payouts in the ini-
tial years, thereby affording providers immediate relief from high
malpractice premiums. 45 The downside, however, is that as claims
come due, the annual increases in PCF assessments typically rise much
faster than the annual increase in traditional premiums under a loss-
reserving approach. 46
Other states use standard loss reserving principles, including Kan-
sas,47 New Mexico, 48 and Wisconsin. 49 In Wisconsin, a state in which
the PCF maintains reserves at a relatively high level,5 0 the Governor
recently proposed to tap $200 million from the fund in order to subsi-
dize Medicaid.51 Louisiana has a statutory requirement that surpluses
must be a specified percentage of assessments. 52 In New York, since
41. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS (Mar. 2004), http://
www.ssa.gov/pubs/10024.pdf.
42. Id.
43. BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 2; OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13.
44. Alfred E. Hofflander et al., Report on the Medical Malpractice Insurance Delivery Sys-
tem in Pennsylvania (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (funded by
the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association).
45. BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 19; ALFRED E. HOFFLANDER & BLAINE F. NYE,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA (1985); Conover et al., supra note 25, at
10.
46. See Hofflander et al., supra note 44.
47. See generally Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, Surcharge Rating System Informa-
tion, at http://www.hcsf.org/ratingpage.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
48. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra note 9, at 30.
49. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13.
50. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., STATE OF WIS., WISCONSIN INSURANCE REPORT (2001),
http://oci.wi.gov/ann-rpt/bus_2001/bus_2001.pdf.
51. Wis. Hosp. Ass'N, 2003-2005 STATE BUDGET: IMPACTS ON WISCONSIN HOSPITALS (Apr.
18, 2003), http://www.wha.org/pubArchive/position-statements/pp2003issuesummary.pdf.
52. State of Louisiana, supra note 7.
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there is no public insurer, it is up to the private insurers to maintain
adequate reserves for losses.53
When actuarial evaluations are performed, the recommendations
are not always followed. 54 The New Mexico Department of Insurance
recently completed an actuarial study concluding that the state's PCF
was underfunded by nine million dollars, but the state medical society
recommended no increase in physician contributions.55 This problem
is not limited to the public sector, however. A survey of privat6 pri-
mary malpractice insurers revealed much the same picture; insurers
said that they had overridden their actuaries' recommendation at least
once in the previous five years. 56 Reasons may differ between the two
groups, with private insurers more worried about losing market share
and PCFs responding to political rather than competitive pressures.
C. Organizational Form and Monitoring
PCFs are public organizations, created by state law and organized
as either a state agency or a trust fund. 57 Because PCFs are public
organizations, they plausibly lack incentive to exploit their dominant
market position by charging monopoly-level premiums. Nor are they
driven by the profit motive to engage in risky financial decisions that
may lead to insolvency. Yet, as very small and self-financed organiza-
tions, they may easily escape public scrutiny, at least for several years,
even from stakeholders, potentially making them less accountable.
1. PCF Boards
Responsibility for PCF performance resides with PCF boards.
Boards may be either self-perpetuating or appointed.58 The main ad-
vantage of a self-perpetuating board is that board composition is less
subject to outside political influence. However, such boards may be
less accountable to the public and to stakeholders. South Carolina
had a self-perpetuating board, until recently. 59 There was very little
turnover, and the board did not provide effective oversight.60 In Wis-
consin, board members are appointed. 61 In practice, membership on
the board is diverse, including faculty members from universities and
53. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10, at 10.
54. See Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, supra note 6.
55. N.M. Med. Soc'y, Council Minutes (Jan. 11, 2003).
56. See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 157.
57. PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., supra note 3, at 4.
58. PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., supra note 22, at 11.
59. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 3.
60. Id. at 13.
61. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 50.
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an actuary.62 The board determines annual assessments and monitors
PCF investments.63 In Kansas, the Board of Governors for the PCF is
responsible for reviewing claims, setting assessments, and making rec-
ommendations on staffing. 64 New Mexico has a unique supporter
called the Medical Legal Liaison Panel, composed of representatives
from the medical and legal communities, which discuss potential
changes to the PCF.65 By incorporating these two different constitu-
encies, any changes that are passed do not favor one group to the
detriment of the other. If the Panel does not agree on the suggested
reforms, then the proposed reforms do not make it through the
legislature. 66
2. Organizational Location of PCFs
A key decision is whether or not to house the PCF in the state De-
partment of Insurance. Such departments potentially offer expertise,
and economies of scale may be realized by combining PCF adminis-
tration with administration of other programs. One PCF indicated
that an advantage of being housed in the Department of Insurance is
that the Department has responsibility for other aspects of medical
malpractice insurance, such as conducting solvency and policy form
regulation activities.
The alternative is to establish a separate state agency, which may
tend to insulate the PCF from political considerations affecting the
Insurance Department more generally. In some states, there has been
controversy about whether PCFs are really insurers or, alternatively,
are risk pools that are not subject to traditional insurance principles
governing such activities as loss reserving and premium setting.
67
Since bureaucracies that interact with a larger number of interest
groups are less likely to be beholden to any one group,68 an indepen-
dent state agency may be more influenced by the provider community
than a PCF located within an Insurance Department.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, Members of the Board of Governors and Staff
Members of the Health Care Stabilization Fund, at http://www.hcsf.orglboard and-staff.htm
(last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
65. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra note 9, at 14.
66. Id.
67. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 12; Hofflander et al., supra note 44,
at 13.
68. See generally Richard C. Elling, Administering State Programs: Performance and Politics,
in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 267 (Virginia Gray et al.
eds., 7th ed. 1999).
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At the time of our interviews, seven PCFs were located in the state
Department of Insurance. Some states have moved their PCFs out of
the Department of Insurance. For example, in Louisiana, oversight of
the PCF was transferred from the Department of Insurance to the
Office of the Governor in the early 1990s; the PCF indicated that this
was done to give the PCF more stability. Following the move, the
PCF's staffing and budget increased appreciably. The Kansas PCF
separated from the Insurance Department in 1995, partially to give
health providers greater control of PCF activities. 69 Although the De-
partment of Insurance continues to be very involved in managing the
PCF in South Carolina, Department representatives were removed
from the PCF Board due to mismanagement of the PCF that necessi-
tated supervision by the legislature.70 Currently, the Department
plays an important role in supervising the PCF, but does not have rep-
resentation on the Board.71
3. External Review
Another mechanism for overseeing PCF activities is periodic exter-
nal review of the PCF. Such reviews are useful, especially in light of
inadequacies of financial performance in the past. In South Carolina,
an initial audit by the state's Legislative Audit Council found that the
PCF was inadequately funded.72 The findings from the first audit
prompted legislative action to modify Board oversight and to increase
the required primary layer of coverage. A follow-up audit in January
2004 concluded that the PCF's funding had improved.73 The PCFs in
Louisiana and Kansas also are subject to periodic legislative audits. 74
In New Mexico, an external evaluation is required every other year.75
The evaluators work with the actuaries to examine different aspects of
the PCF finances and meet with the Medical Legal Liaison Panel to
discuss findings. 76 Wisconsin requires a legislative audit every three
years by the state Legislative Audit Bureau.77
69. See Kansas Health Care Stabilization, Who Runs the Health Care Stabilization Fund, at
http://www.hcsf.org/general3.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
70. S.C LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 12.
71. Id.
72. See id. at v.
73. See generally S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, FOLLOW-UP: A REVIEW OF THE MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE PATIENT'S COMPENSATION FUND (Jan. 2004), http://www.state.sc.us/sclac/Re-
ports/2000/pcf follow-up.pdf.
74. Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, supra note 6, at 11; State of Louisiana, supra note
7, at 12.
75. N.M. PUB. REGULATION COMM'N, supra note 9, at 3.
76. Id.
77. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13, at 10.
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4. Use of Actuarial Advice
In addition to external reviews, actuarial studies are done for all
PCFs, primarily on an annual basis.78 The studies monitor the finan-
cial state of the PCF, determine the level of reserves, suggest the
surcharge needed for the PCF to be actuarially sound, and make other
financial recommendations. The recommendations of actuaries, how-
ever, are not always followed. 79
D. Coverage
Eight of the nine PCFs provide excess medical liability coverage for
hospitals and physicians. New York does not cover hospitals.80 Some
states offer PCF coverage to other providers, such as dentists, chiro-
practors, podiatrists, nursing homes, and HMOs. The PCFs reported
varying levels of interest from those providers that are not covered by
the PCFs. Some states use the existence of a PCF as a recruitment
tool to attract doctors to the state, even highlighting its existence in
recruiting materials.81
1. Required Primary Coverage
Coverage limits provided by the PCFs differ, as do the primary lim-
its required of the health providers. As of early 2004, required limits
of primary coverage ranged from $100,000 in Louisiana to $1.3 million
in New York. These coverage requirements have been updated over
time. For example, in Nebraska, the primary coverage requirement
increased from $100,000 to $200,000 in 1987.82 In 2004, another in-
crease was being considered.83 South Carolina recently increased its
primary limits from $100,000 to $200,000.84 Pennsylvania periodically
increased its primary coverage requirement with its initial PCF, called
the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss (CAT) Fund, and
plans to require increases in the upcoming years until the Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Fund, the suc-
cessor to the CAT Fund, is dissolved in 2009.85 Indiana and Kansas
78. See infra app. A, tbl. 1.
79. SLOAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 6; Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, supra note 6, at
11.
80. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10, at 10.
81. See Aurora Health Care, Physician Services & Recruitment, at http://www.aurorahealth
care.org/jobs/phys-recruit/index.xasp (last modified Dec. 8, 2004).
82. NEB. MED. Ass'N, THE NEBRASKA HOSPITAL-MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT: A SYNoPsIs 4,
www.nol.org/home/NDOI/brochure/b-medmal.pdf (last modified Sept. 14, 2001).
83. Id.
84. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 2.
85. See generally University of Pennsylvania Health System, supra note 39.
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have also increased primary coverage requirements since establishing
their PCFs.86
2. Limits of PCF Coverage
Similar to the varying amount of primary level requirements, cover-
age provided by the PCF also varies from $500,000 per occurrence in
Pennsylvania to unlimited medical expenses per occurrence provided
by four PCFs (Louisiana, New Mexico, South Carolina, and Wiscon-
sin).87 Some PCF limits are indexed, adjusting the non-economic
damages limit annually, while other limits remain fixed until specifi-
cally updated by the state legislature.
The upper limit on liability for PCFs may also be governed by a
statutory limit on total or non-economic loss that applies to all medi-
cal malpractice losses. In Nebraska, the limit only applies to providers
participating in the PCF.88 Caps on damages are controversial, not
only in the context of PCFs.89 Some PCF states included limits on
liability as part of the original design of the PCF. Such limits have
been challenged in the courts, often successfully. 90
Many respondents to our survey maintained that limits on liability
are a necessary condition for the PCF's success. Indiana had a limit
on total damages. For participants in Nebraska's PCF, there was a
$1.75 million cap on economic and non-economic damages. The fol-
lowing four states had limits on non-economic damages: Wisconsin,
Louisiana, New Mexico, and Kansas. South Carolina, Pennsylvania,
and New York did not have caps for medical malpractice, but Penn-
sylvania did limit the liability of its PCF. One PCF respondent re-
marked that it is as important to implement policies to improve
patient safety as it is to reduce exposure to large awards by imple-
menting caps. However, this view was not widespread.
86. See generally Albert, supra note 5; see also Kansas Health Care Stabilization Fund, supra
note 6, at 11.
87. See infra app. A, tbl. 1.
88. NEB. MED. ASS'N, supra note 82, at 1.
89. See generally JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N, VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, RE-
VIEW OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM
(2003), http://jlarc.state.va.us/Reports/Rpt284.pdf; Patricia H. Born & W. Kip Viscusi, The Dis-
tribution of the Insurance Market Effects of Tort Liability Reforms, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 55 (1988).
90. See generally Tanya Albert, Tort Reform Challenges Yield Mixed Results, AM. MED. NEWS,
Aug. 9, 2004, at 12.
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3. Joint Underwriting Associations
During the same time period that PCFs were created, many states
established JUAs to provide a "market of last resort" for those health
providers that could not obtain primary coverage at a reasonable rate.
Five of the nine states had distinct JUAs. New Mexico and New York
did not have a JUA, and South Carolina and Nebraska made little
distinction between the PCF and JUA. In South Carolina, eighty per-
cent of physicians were covered by the JUA (a percentage that has
been maintained for many years), and participation in the JUA re-
quired participation in the PCF. The JUA and PCF pooled their
funds, and defended claims jointly.
E. Claims Management, Loss Prevention, and Patient Safety
Claims management consists of all activities, including legal repre-
sentation, related to lowering the total potential payment from a spe-
cific claim. Loss prevention includes activities conducted to reduce
the probability that a potential grievance results in the filing of a
claim. Patient safety includes all activities undertaken to reduce harm
to patients, including but not limited to use of financial incentives to
deter injuries.
Except for New York, where the PCF only funds the purchase of
private excess insurance, the PCF is not the only insurer in a case.91
For this reason, among others, claims management is a complex pro-
cess. On one hand, having many decisionmakers can greatly increase
the complexity of claims resolution. On the other hand, the PCF has a
financial stake in the outcome, and thus may have a role in the resolu-
tion process.
Some PCFs were passive participants in claims management activi-
ties. Primary insurers generally oversaw claims management. How-
ever, several PCFs had their own claims functions to monitor claims
that penetrated the PCF layer so that they were prepared to assist
with settlement discussions or trials. Wisconsin, New Mexico, Kansas,
and Pennsylvania closely monitored claims filed through their claims
staff. In Wisconsin, prior to involving the PCF in the defense of a
claim, the primary insurer has a statutory obligation to defend the
PCF.92 If the PCF feels that the primary insurer is not acting with the
best interests of the PCF in mind, then it can bring a "bad faith" case
against the insurer. 93 This has only happened once, but the PCF con-
91. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10, at 10.
92. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 50, at 14.
93. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tinues to monitor potential bad faith cases. 94 After the primary in-
surer tenders the claim to the PCF, it is the responsibility of the PCF
to manage the defense of the claim.95
In South Carolina, the close relationship between the PCF and JUA
resulted in a different division of responsibilities. 96 The JUA managed
legal defense and claims, and when the claim reached the PCF limit,
the PCF was asked to tender money for the claim. Three states did
not provide claims management.
In Pennsylvania, there is considerable controversy about the PCF's
role in claims management. 97 Many hospitals interviewed in Penn-
sylvania said that PCF involvement has delayed settlements and
thereby resulted in higher payouts.98 Similar views were expressed by
brokers and primary insurers.
None of the PCFs actively offered loss prevention. However, one
PCF (Pennsylvania) stated that the organization would offer such as-
sistance if it were requested. None of the PCFs offered formal gui-
dance for patient safety issues, leaving this practice to the individual
providers and primary carriers. Wisconsin had a Risk Management
Committee, which was available to provide patient safety guidance to
PCF participants.99 Pennsylvania imposed very specific patient safety
requirements (e.g., mandatory reporting and process standards) that
are viewed by some providers as being an important component of
improving the patient safety climate even though the PCF itself has a
hands-off role in promoting patient safety. In New York, there was a
mandatory risk management requirement for all recipients of the PCF
subsidy.
F. PCF Staffing
Among the nine PCFs, there was a great deal of variation in staffing
levels. Authorized staff sizes ranged from zero in New York to fifty-
five in Pennsylvania. Expressing staffing as the ratio of paid losses in
2002 to the number of authorized staff at the interview date, ratios
ranged from $1.1 million to $5 million. Paid loss data were only avail-
able for five of the nine PCFs. 100 Some low staffing levels may reflect
the fact that other organizations have taken over some functions (e.g.,
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 31.
97. Conover et al., supra note 25, at 10.
98. Id.
99. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INS., supra note 13. at 54.
100. See infra app. A, fig. 1 (Paid Claims per PCF Staff Member).
[Vol. 54:247
2005] PUBLIC MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 261
premium collection and claims handling). In some cases, there is a
large staffing component that manages the PCF. In cases where there
is no dedicated staff, the Department of Insurance personnel set aside
different percentages of their workday to focus on PCF responsibili-
ties. Staffing levels did not change much from 2001 to 2003, with
PCFs fairly constant in their staffing budget and specific needs. None
of the PCFs reported difficulty in filling positions, with one respon-
dent commenting that the PCF has a good reputation and individuals
have gone to work at the PCF because of this reputation. Another
respondent commented that many insurers viewed the PCF as a
"training base" for future employees. The PCF was a good place to
learn the business, and staff often moved on to the private sector due
to higher salaries and better career advancement opportunities.
In terms of the type of staff employed, PCFs hired their own attor-
neys and also contracted out defense work for claims that reached
trial. For example, in Wisconsin, the PCF contracted with different
defense counsel for each case. For their actuarial needs, PCFs also
reported a mixture of in-house staff and contractors. Reports were
typically completed on an annual basis. Nebraska has a review con-
ducted by the actuary on staff and then supplements this report with
an external actuarial study.
IV. How SUCCESSFUL HAVE THE PCFs BEEN?
Since the overarching objective of the PCFs was to improve the af-
fordability and availability of medical malpractice insurance in the
states, the main question is whether or not such insurance has become
more available and affordable because of the presence of a PCF. Al-
though all PCFs share this common goal, there is considerable hetero-
geneity among PCFs. Thus, it is also important to gauge whether
certain design features have contributed to the PCF's success or lack
thereof.
A. Trends in Losses
The notion that medical malpractice insurance is more available
and affordable because of the presence of PCFs cannot be conclu-
sively demonstrated with available data or data that could be assem-
bled at reasonable cost. In a general sense, private insurance was
available in all states with PCFs; but in South Carolina, virtually all
insurance was issued by the JUA and the PCF. Also, hospitals differ
from physicians in that they are subject to much higher losses. Thus,
even in Pennsylvania, where the PCF limits on coverage were low, the
perception was that the limits work for physicians, where they effec-
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tively serve as excess coverage. The limits did not work for hospitals
where very similar limits effectively serve as a working layer between
primary and additional excess coverage, which is often desired by
these facilities.
On cost of coverage, premiums have increased dramatically in some
states, including some states with PCFs, but the increases are probably
for many reasons beyond the control of PCFs. Based on available
data on losses paid by PCFs during 1998-2002, expressed in 2002 dol-
lars using the general Consumer Price Index, there was considerable
variation in recent trends in losses among the five PCF states for
which trends could be measured. l01 Kansas experienced a decrease in
paid losses.' 0 2 Pennsylvania had a slight increase.10 3 South Carolina
experienced the largest percent increase by far, with Louisiana and
Wisconsin in between Pennsylvania and South Carolina.10 4
Using data from the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB),
trends in claims frequency are very similar between PCF and non-PCF
states.10 5 Since PCF payments were not included in the NPDB data, it
was not possible to calculate mean total severity of loss or total losses
incurred by private and public insurers in PCF states.
B. Opinions of the PCFs Themselves
Perhaps not surprisingly, when asked whether the PCF serves a use-
ful role in their state, all respondents answered "yes." No PCF had
direct evidence to demonstrate that availability and affordability were
improved, but they provided the following types of arguments. First,
as excess insurers, the PCFs reduced the volatility of losses exper-
ienced by other private medical malpractice insurers. Second, PCFs
have made their states more attractive to primary insurers by limiting
their exposure to high losses, even in states without statutory limits on
liability. Such limits are considered helpful in achieving market stabil-
ity. Third, compared with private insurers, PCFs have low administra-
tive expense. Although not explicitly stated, this may not only reflect
lean staffing and state salary scales, but also differences in risk-bearing
between PCFs and private insurers. In contrast to private insurers, in
states with mandatory participation in PCFs, the PCF has the ability
101. See S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, supra note 12, at 16; infra app. A, fig. 2 (Normal-
ized Paid Claims 1998-2002).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See infra app. A, fig. 3 (Medical Malpractice Payment Reports by Year: PCF States and
Non-PCF States).
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to assess providers retroactively to cover overruns. In the latter sense,
at least, lower cost is not necessarily an advantage.
We asked the PCFs whether the market could have been served
better by using a private excess carrier. Private excess coverage was
available in all states, but the majority of PCFs added that such cover-
age was at a high cost. Hospitals were typically more inclined to in-
vestigate obtaining excess coverage; however, in South Carolina
hospitals self-insure. There was no excess market in South Carolina
since the PCF covered all damages above the $200,000 primary cover-
age limit. In Pennsylvania, the PCF provided excess coverage for phy-
sicians, but many hospitals obtained excess coverage above the
MCARE limit. Private excess insurers have generally required a sub-
stantial buffer between the MCARE limit and where their coverage
begins. Much of this can be attributed to business decisions, such as
not wanting to be exposed to lower layers, but at least some appears
to be motivated by concerns about the complications that ensue when
the hospital and PCF do not see eye-to-eye on whether to settle or go
to trial on a particular claim.
The Wisconsin PCF gave several reasons for its success. The rea-
sons in descending order of importance were as follows: mandatory
participation; mandatory primary insurance for providers; effective
communication between the PCF and the agency that licenses provid-
ers to monitor error-prone providers; and limits on liability for non-
economic damages and wrongful death. In New York, the existence
of the excess program was given as one of five reasons that insurance
has remained available in that state and a surge in premiums has been
avoided.
Theoretically, the existence of a PCF may reduce incentives for loss
prevention defined as improving patient safety, reducing the
probability that a claim is filed, and managing claims to reduce the
amount of indemnity, legal fees, and other expenses incurred by de-
fendants. State-sponsored excess coverage also creates a moral haz-
ard for primary insurers. Without a PCF, a primary insurer should
defend claims up to the point at which the last dollar spent on preven-
tion equals the saving in payments to claimants. An insurer with fore-
sight is also likely to assess the effect of its current defense strategy on
future claims.106 When a PCF exists, however, the primary insurer's
incentive to fight large claims may be substantially reduced because
savings from effort it expends near the dollar threshold of excess cov-
106. See generally Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198
(1987); Holger Sieg, Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence
from Medical Malpractice Disputes, 108 J. PoL. ECON. 1006 (2000).
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erage will accrue not to itself, but to the PCF or to all insured provid-
ers in the state as a group. 0 7
The majority of PCFs did not impose surcharges on insureds based
on the individual insured's loss experience, which could moderate this
effect. By contrast, private excess carriers do engage in experience-
rating.10 8 Having a poor loss history is likely to be a disadvantage in
the market for excess insurance and this will likely translate into
higher premiums.
In practice, the PCFs and others we interviewed saw little relation-
ship between having a PCF and patient safety, loss prevention, and
claims management. They viewed PCFs as primarily passive financial
intermediaries. In their view, they did not promote patient safety, loss
prevention, and claims management or do anything to lessen the in-
centives for insureds to engage in these activities. Some PCFs consid-
ered these activities responsibilities of primary insurers rather than
responsibilities of private excess insurers or PCFs. The latter just han-
dle money.
C. Opinions of Brokers, Private Excess Insurers, and Hospitals
Brokers and private excess insurers were less enthusiastic about the
PCF concept overall, but indicated that some of the states with PCFs
were attractive to private insurers. In some states, public PCFs could
be seen as competitors of private excess insurers. The presence of a
PCF would "crowd out" demand for private excess insurance.
An important exception was Pennsylvania. In one sense, these re-
spondents stated that Pennsylvania's PCF was in a different market
since the private excess insurers only provided coverage at much
higher losses. A private excess insurer of a hospital might begin cov-
erage at a loss of $10 million per occurrence. By contrast, Penn-
sylvania's MCARE limits were $500,000 to $1 million. We only
interviewed hospitals in Pennsylvania. 109 In that state, several hospi-
tals raised administrative issues about MCARE, including difficulties
in coordinating defense strategies when several insurers, including
MCARE, were involved in the defense of a case. Another problem in
Pennsylvania was the state PCF's high level of unfunded liabilities.
Some brokers cited other administrative concerns, such as inconsistent
messages from the staff, claims handling problems, changing rules,
and lack of coordination between the physician and hospital sides of
107. HOFFLANDER & NYE, supra note 45, at xiv.
108. See generally NEIL DOHERTY & KENT SMETTERS, MORAL HAZARD IN REINSURANCE
MARKETS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9050, 2002).
109. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10, at 10.
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the business. 110 There was a consensus that MCARE should be abol-
ished. On the other hand, we heard from several brokers and excess
insurers that PCFs in the other states had a neutral and, more com-
monly, a positive influence on the attractiveness to offshore markets.
In some cases, there was no direct familiarity with the state since the
PCF wrote all of the excess insurance business. Based on these re-
sponses, it appears that Pennsylvania's problems do not generalize to
other PCFs.
V. STATE MEDICAL LIABILITY REPORT CARDS
One other crude indicator of how the PCF states are faring relative
to other states comes from state report cards prepared by NORCAL
Mutual Insurance Company, based on a variety of indicators, includ-
ing average patient payment, patient payment frequency, total patient
payments, average delay of patient payments, physician and consumer
cost burdens, and various measures of market structure.'11 Grades
and points were assigned based on a state's ranking on ten such in-
dicators. We found that the average ranking for PCF states was lower
than in non-PCF states and their grade point average was slightly
higher, suggesting their overall malpractice climate was somewhat
"better." 112 This hardly counts as definitive evidence, but is generally
consistent with the subjective impressions provided by our
respondents.
VI. Is THERE A ROLE FOR PCFs?
State governments operate PCFs. Public sponsorship has an impor-
tant advantage: assuring availability of coverage. Like JUAs and un-
like private insurers, PCFs do not withdraw from the market during
crisis periods. 113 Demand for private excess coverage by primary
medical malpractice insurers is directly related to the volatility of
loss. 114 Because private excess insurance covers large, infrequent
losses, it is itself volatile in terms of availability and premiums. By
contrast, a PCF can keep excess coverage available because its deci-
sion to supply coverage is not guided by prospective rates of return.
Excess coverage primarily relies on offshore insurers, which have an
110. Id.
111. Measures of market structures include leading company market share and number of A-
rated competitors.
112. See infra app. A, tbl. 2.
113. This is because they are public programs.
114. See generally Thomas J. Hoerger et al., Loss Volatility, Bankruptcy, and the Demand for
Reinsurance, 3 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221 (1990).
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incentive to shift funds to other sectors when the medical malpractice
line becomes unprofitable." 5
With the exception of New York, financing generally comes entirely
from premiums paid by physicians, hospitals, and investment income.
Thus, rather than call it a public provision, it is more accurate to say
that PCFs offer a statutorily sanctioned mechanism for providers to
pool risk. In this sense, if the groups responsible for financing PCFs
want to keep them, and no other major distortions can be identified,
there is a strong case for retaining them. However, there are other
statutorily sanctioned mechanisms, most importantly risk retention
groups, which are private organizations and also perform the risk
pooling function. PCFs do not reduce medical liability exposure, un-
less they undertake specific loss prevention actions. Rather, they
transfer costs to a different funding mechanism. 116
VII. PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS
When considering what to do with PCFs, states face three options:
phase out the PCF (as is scheduled to occur in 2009 in Pennsylvania),
modify the PCF, or continue the status quo. As one PCF respondent
commented, "if it's not broke, why fix it?" But the question remains
whether the PCFs are "broke," and if so, how to resolve the situation
and bring the private insurers back into the state market to provide
affordable coverage. When asked about ways to reform and modify
the PCF, respondents focused on tasks that proved to be problematic
in their workdays, such as streamlining internal operations, improving
communication, and improving other technical aspects of the PCF,
rather than focusing on larger structural changes. Some respondents
proposed larger reforms such as changes in primary limits and having
a better sense of surcharges that are actuarially sound.
The decision for states is whether the PCF concept is sound and
makes a contribution to availability and affordability of medical mal-
practice insurance. If the answer to this question is "yes," then several
questions about PCF design follow.
VIII. ARE PCFs WORTH HAVING?
Our conclusion is that PCFs may be worth having if they are de-
signed correctly. Crises in availability and in premiums tend to be
serious when they occur. But the disruptions tend to be quite limited
115. William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, in
HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK 15 (Alice Gosfield ed., 2003).
116. PINNACLE ACTUARIAL RES., INC., supra note 3, at 10.
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in duration. At the time of our survey, we found no evidence that
private excess insurance was unavailable in any PCF state, unless the
PCF had crowded out such private coverage. Thus, the issue is
whether states wish to have the PCF in reserve as a "back-up" plan in
the event that coverage goes away. Because this can happen so
quickly, it may be preferable to have the PCF already in place, with
the kinks worked out, rather than attempt to create this mechanism
on the fly in the heat of a crisis.
Should PCFs be retained by the states that have them and should
the concept be adopted by other states? There are several reasons for
and against the retention or adoption. On the plus side, if the stake-
holders want to have them, why should others object? Except in New
York, no public funds are being used. 117 If enrollment in the PCF is
voluntary, the PCF is just another competitor in the marketplace.
PCFs can be designed to look like a private insurer. Finally, PCFs
have several purported advantages, including reductions in volatility
of claims and seemingly low administrative costs. Reduced volatility
makes states more attractive to primary insurers.
In terms of the drawbacks, it may be politically impossible to craft a
PCF of optimal design. It may be more difficult for a public agency to
deal with physicians and other providers with bad loss records. If the
PCF acts as a financial intermediary, it may be seen as unduly passive
and apathetic toward promoting patient safety and other worthwhile
objectives. Conversely, if the PCF does not act cooperatively with
other insurers, PCFs may impose an added transactions cost. In cases
in which the PCF acts prudently, by maintaining adequate reserves to
cover anticipated losses, political pressures (for example, those stem-
ming from a large budget deficit), may lead to tampering with loss
reserves. Wisconsin's experience is a case in point.118 By limiting its
role to subsidizing purchase of excess insurance, the New York pro-
gram avoids these negatives. 119 However, it also avoids the plus of
stakeholder financing of the program.
Although it is possible to design an effective PCF, the "proof of
pudding" is in successful implementation. Historical evidence is use-
ful in describing possible practical barriers to successful program
implementation.
117. See infra app. A, tbl. 1.
118. Wis. Hosp. Ass'N, supra note 51, at 14.
119. N.Y. STATE DEP'r OF INS., supra note 10, at 14.
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IX. DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE PCF
If PCFs are to be retained and/or states are to adopt them, how
should they be designed? In the end, design may be more important
than whether or not a PCF exists.
A. There Are Arguments for Both Mandatory and
Voluntary Participation
Voluntary insurance markets are vulnerable to adverse selection if
premiums do not precisely match risk. Primary medical malpractice
insurance is not usually experience-rated. 120 Compulsory participa-
tion in a PCF can avoid adverse selection, which is otherwise likely to
occur if high-loss physicians or hospitals are able to obtain coverage at
average rates. However, requiring low-risk participants to subsidize
high-risk participants may be viewed as unfair. An alternative per-
spective is that the PCF should serve as an insurer of last resort. If so,
adverse selection is anticipated, and the PCF provides a mechanism
for pooling losses among high-risk providers, possibly supplemented
by contributions from all insurers in the same fashion as is routinely
done with state guaranty funds in many other lines of insurance. The
downside of the state guaranty fund model is that evidence from the
property and casualty market suggests that it may be subject to moral
hazard.12' Also, a voluntary PCF may usefully offer patient safety and
loss prevention programs, which presumably would benefit providers
who have incurred large losses in the past. Thus, the ultimate judg-
ment as to whether mandatory participation is a desirable feature de-
pends on the state's objective in establishing the PCF.
B. PCF Coverage Limits Should Clearly Position the PCF as an
Excess Insurer
Because most statutes have not established upper limits on liability,
health care providers remain vulnerable to very high dollar claims.
Philadelphia juries, for example, commonly award amounts exceeding
one million dollars.12 2 The amount of private excess coverage pur-
chased in states with PCFs is unknown. In Pennsylvania, the presence
of a PCF has not eliminated hospital demand for private excess cover-
120. See Sloan, supra note 2, at 38.
121. James G. Bohn & Brian J. Hall, The Costs of Insurance Company Failures, in THE Eco-
NOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 139 (David F. Bradford ed., 1998).
122. BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 26.
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age. 123 A PCF's limit on liability should be sufficiently high so as to
position it as an excess insurer. Covering losses in the mid-range of
losses, as in Pennsylvania, serves no useful purpose. Entities seeking
higher levels of loss protection must obtain such coverage from pri-
vate sources. Problems in both availability and in the price of cover-
age from the private sector are most likely at the high end of the loss
distribution. Liability limits should be indexed so as to obviate the
need for legislative action to change limits.
C. From the Standpoint of a PCF, Having Statutory Limits on
Liability Is Useful
Establishing limits on non-economic and total loss for medical mal-
practice is one of the most popular options among insurers and poten-
tial defendants more generally. 124 A general evaluation of caps is
beyond the scope of this analysis. For an excess insurer, whether pri-
vate or public, having caps is useful for loss control. Pennsylvania has
no caps, but the PCF has an established upper limit on payment. Al-
though such limits also reduce risk to the PCF and ultimately to the
premium payers, having a limit on coverage but not on non-economic
or total loss has meant that providers, especially hospitals, have
sought excess coverage from private insurers, thus making the PCF a
working layer.
D. PCFs Should Offer Some Incentives for Injury Deterrence
This may be done in several alternative ways. One is to experience
rate premiums, which is done by some PCFs and all private excess
insurers. A problem with the use of experience-rating for high losses
is that such losses tend to occur infrequently. Thus, an experience-
rated system may be excessively punitive since past losses may not be
predictive of future losses. On the other hand, refraining from experi-
ence-rating at all goes too far in the other direction, completely elimi-
nating the potential deterrent effect.
Rather than completely rely on experience-rating, PCFs might offer
premium discounts to providers who have. As of early 2004, no PCF
offers such discounts, although risk management training is required
of participants in New York's PCF. Given the lack of empirical evi-
dence establishing that such programs achieve savings, especially for
the range of losses that PCFs typically cover, PCFs should proceed
123. Hosp. & HEALTHSYSTEM Ass'N OF PA., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY COVERAGE IN PENN-
SYLVANIA: FINDINGS OF STATEWIDE SURVEY (May 2002), http://www.haponline.org/downloads/
LiabilitySrvy0502FINAL.pdf.
124. BIONDI & GUREVITCH, supra note 20, at 8.
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cautiously in implementing explicit financial incentives to adopt such
programs.
E. Avoid Pay-As-You-Go Financing
This approach has practical appeal in that policyholders can enjoy
benefits currently without incurring the associated costs. The advan-
tage of postponing the cost obligation is particularly attractive in an
unpredictable, "long-tail" line, such as medical liability insurance; it
helps solve short-term crises in availability of excess coverage without
imposing the immediate pain of high premium assessments. In the
first few years, losses tend to be low because most claims have not yet
been resolved, allowing assessments to be low as well.125 Later, how-
ever, losses mount, and PCFs often must raise premiums sharply, in-
curring the wrath of premium-payers and precipitating political
pressures for reform. 126 Several states have used pay-as-you-go fi-
nancing in the past, but only Pennsylvania has retained it.127 Even
recognizing the short-term political benefit, pay-as-you-go financing
almost assures a future financial crisis. Thus, there is a strong case for
setting aside reserves at the time the claim is filed.
Since it seems prudent for insurers to loss reserve, why would legis-
latures in some states have eschewed the practice? One reason, sug-
gested by Professors Hofflander and Nye, 128 is that the pay-as-you-go
approach simplifies administration. Instead of having to compute
reserves and invest those funds prudently, the PCF assumes that prov-
iders are aware of the liability accruing and are holding "reserves" of
their own.129 Reserves held by public agencies are also vulnerable to
exploitation for unrelated ?urposes. 130 The most important explana-
tion, however, is politics. Failure to reserve attracts political support
for a PCF because excess coverage seems inexpensive in the PCF's
initial years. When the unfunded liability from past policy years even-
tually becomes due and payable, it is easy to label the malpractice
system "out of control" instead of confronting the design flaws in the
PCF.131
125. ALFRED E. HOFFLANDER ET AL., REPORT ON THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE
DELIVERY SYSTEM IN PENNSYLVANIA 3 (2001); BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 19;
Conover et al., supra note 25, at 23.
126. BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 19; HOFFLANDER & NYE, supra note 45, at 31;
Conover et al., supra note 25, at 23.
127. BOVBJERG & BARTOW, supra note 11, at 19; Conover et al., supra note 25, at 4.
128. HOFFLANDER & NYE, supra note 45, at 31.
129. Id.
130. Wis. Hosp. ASS'N, supra note 51, at 14.
131. See generally HOFFLANDER ET AL., supra note 125.
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However, the countervailing arguments appear stronger, and apply
equally to public agencies and private insurers. First, the objective of
insurance is to protect policyholders against loss. If there is substan-
tial insolvency risk, health care providers remain vulnerable. Second,
insurers have a comparative advantage in loss reserving. Unlike actu-
aries, health care providers do not possess the requisite data or exper-
tise to make such projections.
F. On Balance, Public Provision Is a Better Alternative than
Public Subsidization
New York's program is unique in subsidizing insurance purchased
from sources other than providers. 32 Public subsidies of private in-
surance may have succeeded in a state such as New York with a his-
tory of extensive regulation of insurance premiums and insurer
solvency. 133 In a less regulatory environment, subsidies run the risk of
adding to existing demand for insurance and ultimately to medical
malpractice premiums. Also, a policy of subsidizing persons with high
incomes may be objectionable on equity grounds.
X. CONCLUSION
Compared to major tort and insurance reforms, PCFs have received
virtually no attention by scholars. With an exception or two, they are
not a major focus of public policy debate either. Because they are
small organizations and there have been lengthy periods in which
medical malpractice markets are quiescent, they have not attracted
much scrutiny. Given a lack of quantitative evidence, our evaluation
depended on qualitative evidence. Yet PCFs address the fundamental
issues of medical malpractice that have led to reoccurring crises in the
availability of medical malpractice insurance coverage and in its pre-
miums for such coverage. As such, PCFs represent a potentially effec-
tive policy instrument when designed correctly.
132. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF INS., supra note 10, at 10.
133. Id.
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FIGURE 1: PAID CLAIMS PER PCF STAFF MEMBER
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Sources:
All staffing data were received from conversations with PCF representatives in South
Carolina, Wisconsin, Kansas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania. The 2002 paid claims
data for Wisconsin, Kansas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania came from information pro-
vided by the PCFs. Data for South Carolina came from the Follow-up Audit re-
port 1 3 4 conducted by the South Carolina Legislative Audit Council. We then
calculated the ratio of paid claims to individual staff member. South Carolina staff-
ing includes the JUA since the JUA and PCF share many duties.
NORMALIZED
FIGURE 2:
PAID CLAIMS 1998-2002
2000 2002
250
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+Wl
LA
- PA
-- KS
134. S.C. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT COUNCIL, FOLLOW-UP: A REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE PATIENTS' COMPENSATION FUND (Jan. 2004), http://www.state.sc.us/sclac/Reports/
2000/PCFFollow-up.pdf/.
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Paid claims data were translated into 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.
Next, we normalized paid claims to $100 in 1998 and calculated the increases/de-
creases across the 1998-2002 time period. Paid claims data for Wisconsin, Kansas,
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania came from information provided by the PCFs. Data for
South Carolina came from the legislative audit report (January 2000) and the follow-
up legislative audit report (January 2004) conducted by the South Carolina Legisla-
tive Audit Council. South Carolina jointly reports PCF and JUA paid claims.
Sources:
South Carolina: South Carolina Legislative Audit Council, January 2000,
Follow-up Audit, January 2004.135
Wisconsin: 2002 Functional and Progress Report to the Legislature (page 6), pro-
vided by Wisconsin PCF.
Louisiana: Information provided by the Louisiana PCF.
Pennsylvania: Medical malpractice claims data provided by MCARE.
Kansas: Information provided by Kansas PCF.
FIGURE 3: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PAYMENT REPORTS BY YEAR
PCF STATES AND NoN-PCF STATES
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400 s PCF Mean
-o-- Non-PCF
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Sources:
Figure 3 was compiled using data from the 1999-2002 Annual Reports of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services' Division of Practitioner Data Banks.
1 36
135. Id.
136. Div. oF NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANKS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2002 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 7, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/pubs/stats/2002_NPDB-AnnualRe-
port.pdf; 2001 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 7, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/pubs/stats/200l-NPDBAn-
nualReport.pdf; 2000 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 7, http://www.npdb-hipdb.compubs/stats/200
0
-
NPDBAnnualReport.pdf; 1999 ANNUAL REPORT tbl. 7, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/pubs/
stats/1999 NPDBAnnualReport.pdf.
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TABLE 2: MEDICAL LIABILITY REPORT CARD 2000, PCF
STATES VS. NoN-PCF STATES
State Rank Grade GPA
Average PCF State 19.7 C 2.3
Indiana 8 B 3.0
Kansas 17 C 2.6
Louisiana 25 C 2.2
Nebraska 2 B 3.3
New Mexico 11 C 2.8
New York 51 F 0.5
Pennsylvania 43 D 1.0
South Carolina 15 C 2.6
Wisconsin 5 B 3.1
Average Non-PCF State 27.4 C 2.0
Note: the highest assigned grade was B and the lowest was F. The highest GPA was
3.6 and the lowest was 0.5.
Source: NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company, January 6, 2003.
